The Army and Vietnam by Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr

Author:Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Format: mobi, epub
Published: 2010-01-30T12:00:00+00:00

How Much Is Enough?

COMUSMACV had directed that a study on force requirements be initiated in late June in response to a query from Washington on force levels required for 1966. The MACV Staff quickly realized that with the current force ratio at 1.7:1, traditional force ratios of 10:1 or 15:1 posited for counter insurgency were out of reach. However, rather than question the Army's approach to the war, the staff fit the insurgency to suit the desired American strategy and the resources at hand for executing it.

First, it was decided that the forces of the opposing sides would be measured in maneuver battalions. While certainly appropriate in that it partially discounted the soldiers comprising the large logistical "tail" of U.S. units, the criterion omitted nearly ioo,ooo vc irregulars. Compounding the distortion, ARVN battalions were rated as equal to vc battalions, while U.S. Army and Free World Forces battalions were rated as equivalent to two vc battalions, and U.S. Marines as equivalent to three. By and large, ARVN battalions were inferior to their vc counterparts in both morale and leadership. They were also, on average, smaller than vc battalions, averaging around 35o effectives, compared with 450 for the vc.89 Of course, the ARVN had more firepower, and that was what counted in evaluating them in terms of the Concept.

Further compromising their evaluation, the MACV Staff concluded that the conflict had passed into phase 3, the equivalent of conventional war for the Army (although not for the insurgents). Thus, a force ratio of 3:1 or 4: I was acceptable just as in other wars where it had proven its effective- ness.9° This last step required a considerable leap of logic on the part of the staffers and the brass, who had to ignore not only insurgency warfare doctrine but CIA and DIA intelligence reports as well. For example, one CIA report submitted on 29 June noted:

The Communists continue to emphasize classic tactics of ambush and envelopment. . . . [relying] primarily on erosive tactics, including widespread terrorism, harassment, and sabotage. Combined with political subversion, these tactics are serving to undermine and discredit government authority in the countryside... .

Their main force capability has by no means been fully committed as yet, and it is by no means certain that the Viet Cong are prepared to go all-out.9'

Finally, the MACV staff added to percent to the number of friendlybattalion equivalents to account for their superiority in firepower and the airmobility factor.92

In spite of the "fudge factors" introduced into the study, the staff could only generate a 2.4:1 ratio in friendly-battalion equivalents to vc battalions (see table 3). With anticipated increases in VC/PAVN forces accounted for, the allied forces provided for in the 44-battalion request would only move the force ratio to 3.2:1. Nevertheless, it satisfied the 3:1 requirement, and that, not an analysis of the conflict, was the study's purpose. As for 1966, it was projected that 117 enemy battalions would be in the field. By adding on eighteen Army and six Marine battalions

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